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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
         We confront in this case a difficult issue arising under 
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2), the provision of the Bankruptcy Code (the 
"Code") allowing for avoidance of constructively fraudulent 
transfers.  The principal question we must decide is whether a 
commitment letter Mellon Bank issued in connection with a 
contemplated $53-million loan conferred "reasonably equivalent 
value" on Intershoe (the debtor) in exchange for $515,000 in 
commitment fees that Intershoe paid to Mellon Bank.  This question 
is complicated by the fact that the loan, which could possibly have 
saved Intershoe from bankruptcy, ultimately failed to close.  We 
also must decide whether Intershoe was insolvent when it 
transferred the commitment fees to Mellon Bank. 
         After finding that Intershoe was insolvent during the 
relevant period, the bankruptcy court, relying on a "totality of 
the circumstances" test, concluded that Intershoe had not received 
"reasonably equivalent value" in exchange for the $515,000 in fees 
it had paid to Mellon.  The court found that the loan commitment 
was so conditional when issued that it conferred virtually no 
indirect economic benefit on Intershoe.  It therefore ordered 
Mellon Bank to remit to the bankrupt estate all but $127,538.04 of 
the commitment fees, an amount representing Mellon Bank's out-of- 
pocket expenses.  The district court summarily affirmed.  Because 
the commitment letter was so conditional that the chances of the 
loan closing were minimal, we agree that Intershoe did not receive 
value that was reasonably equivalent to the fees it paid Mellon 
Bank.  Accordingly, we, too, will affirm. 
                                I. 
                                A. 
         At all times relevant to this dispute, Intershoe was a 
large-scale wholesale distributor of women's shoes.  Through 1991, 
its primary secured lender was Signet Bank.  In the spring of 1991, 
Intershoe was aware that its financing arrangement with Signet 
would terminate that fall.  It therefore sought to recapitalize and 
refinance its operations.  Intershoe wanted to attract a $15 
million equity investment; it also wanted to replace Signet as its 
lender with a bank group that would extend a $53 million loan 
facility.  
         In March of 1991, Three Cities Research ("TCR") made an 
initial, nonbinding proposal to make a $15 million investment in 
Intershoe and began to conduct due diligence and negotiations 
toward that end.  Hoping that the prospect of an equity infusion 
would entice potential lenders, Intershoe approached Mellon Bank,  
Bank of New York ("BNY") and Citicorp to discuss potential 
refinancing. Each bank made clear that an equity infusion would be 
a prerequisite to any refinancing.  Representatives of Mellon and 
Intershoe first met in either February or March of 1991. 
         On June 13, 1991, Mellon issued a proposal letter 
documenting its interest in extending a $53 million revolving line 
of credit and a $100 million foreign exchange line of credit.  The 
proposal was contingent upon TCR's injection of $15 million in 
cash.  At first, Intershoe did not accept Mellon's offer.  Instead, 
it explored the possibility of obtaining financing from BNY and 
Citicorp.  After completing its due diligence, however, Citicorp 
declined to extend credit to Intershoe.  Although BNY had made a 
proposal, it subsequently revised the proposal to require a large 
equity infusion.  Intershoe therefore declined to endorse BNY's 
proposal and, instead, turned its attention back to Mellon Bank. 
         On August 9, 1991, Mellon Bank issued a second proposal 
letter that was similar to the first in that it was conditioned 
upon the injection of new capital funds of at least $15 million.  
The letter also stated that Intershoe would be required to pay: (1) 
a facility fee equivalent to 3/4 of one percent (.0075) of the 
committed facility (half upon issuance of the commitment letter, 
half at closing); (2) a collateral management fee of $10,000; (3) 
all of Mellon's out-of-pocket expenses, regardless of whether the 
financing occurred; and (4) a "good faith deposit" of $125,000 to 
be remitted with written approval of the proposal letter.  A fifth 
provision in the letter was that Mellon would be permitted to 
spread $28 of the $53 million loan among a group of banks.  The 
loan contemplated by Mellon was known as a highly leveraged 
transaction ("HLT"), an asset-based loan bearing greater risk than 
an ordinary loan that requires extraordinary due diligence and 
monitoring of the borrower's accounts receivable, inventory and 
business plan. 
         On August 12, 1991, Intershoe remitted to Mellon the 
$125,000 "good faith deposit" in accordance with the proposal 
letter.  Because it had reached its borrowing limit with the Signet 
Group, Intershoe could not borrow additional sums.  Between August 
and October of 1991, Intershoe failed to pay the majority of 
invoices from its suppliers.  While accounts payable increased by 
$10 million, its debt to the Signet Group decreased by the same 
amount; Intershoe was using what funds it had to pay down its debt.  
As a result, the Signet group agreed to extend its loan facility 
from September 30 to November 29, 1991, which permitted Intershoe 
to continue its business operations. 
         In early October of 1991, Mellon Bank requested an 
additional good faith deposit from Intershoe of $125,000, although 
there was nothing to document this request.  On October 8 or 9, 
1991, Intershoe remitted the additional $125,000 to Mellon Bank by 
wire transfer.  On October 31, 1991, Westinghouse, to whom 
Intershoe had subordinated indebtedness, agreed to restructure 
Intershoe's indebtedness in order to accommodate the proposed 
recapitalization. 
         On November 7, 1991, Mellon issued a formal commitment 
letter (the "Letter") with terms that tracked the August 9 proposal 
letter.  The Letter referred to the $250,000 in good faith deposits 
that Mellon had previously received and indicated that the entire 
amount would be retained even if the loan did not close.  These 
deposits would cover Mellon's expense, time and effort in 
attempting to consummate the financing.  The Letter also required 
the remittance of an additional $265,000, half of which represented 
a nonrefundable "facility fee" for Mellon's commitment, with the 
other half representing a nonrefundable agent's fee for Mellon's 
syndication of the loan.  The Letter also contained several 
conditions: (1) Intershoe had to produce a draft audited financial 
statement indicating that it had a net worth of at least $6.5 
million; (2) Intershoe was required to repay or retire 
Westinghouse's debt and stock warrants and retain Westinghouse as 
a creditor for subordinated debt of at least $5 million; (3) $28 
million of the loan commitment had to be participated out to a 
group of banks; and (4) Intershoe would be required to pay a 
separate collateral monitoring fee relating to administering the 
loan after closing.  By its terms, the commitment was set to expire 
on November 29, 1991, the same day that Signet's loan facility was 
due to expire. 
         On November 7, 1991, Intershoe accepted Mellon's 
commitment and remitted the $260,000 fee as contemplated by the 
Letter.  That day Mellon began a "takedown examination" to update 
Intershoe's financial information through the closing date.  Eight 
days later Mellon received a draft financial statement confirming 
that Intershoe possessed a positive net worth of $6.5 million 
dollars.  Mellon then scheduled a meeting for November 20, 1991, 
with Intershoe, the loan participants, TCR (the equity investor) 
and Peat Marwick to discuss further the financial statements. 
         On November 17, 1991, however, TCR advised Intershoe that 
it had decided not to make the $15 million equity investment and 
confirmed its withdrawal from the proposed refinancing.  Intershoe 
informed Mellon of this development the next day, and the entire 
deal collapsed.  Intershoe's trade creditors continued to extend 
credit even after the collapse of the Mellon financing. 
         On November 15, 1991, Peat Marwick issued to Intershoe an 
audited financial statement for the fiscal year ending August 31, 
1991.  This statement indicated that as of August 31, Intershoe's 
liabilities exceeded its assets by four million dollars.  In 
accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") 
and Generally Accepted Accounting Standards ("GAAS"), the financial 
statement took into account events subsequent to the end of the 
fiscal year (e.g., the collapse of the Mellon financing) as 
evidence of Intershoe's financial condition.  Several questionable 
items on Intershoe's balance sheet were corrected or adjusted, 
resulting in an even lower net worth.  The financial statement also 
indicated that Intershoe would have difficulty continuing as a 
going concern.  On December 11, 1991, Intershoe agreed to accept 
Peat Marwick's suggested changes to its financial statements.  
Intershoe's financial condition continued to decline, reaching a 
point where its liabilities exceeded assets by $14 million.  
Intershoe sought protection under Chapter Eleven of the Code on 
February 18, 1992. 
                                B. 
         On May 18, 1993, the Committee filed an adversary 
proceeding against Mellon Bank seeking to recover, as 
constructively fraudulent transfers, the three payments that 
Intershoe had made to Mellon in connection with the financing 
commitment, which totaled $515,000.  Under section 548(a)(2) of the 
Code, the Committee bore the burden of establishing that: (1) the 
debtor had an interest in the property; (2) the transfer of the 
interest occurred within one year of the petition; (3) the debtor 
was insolvent at the time of the transfer or became insolvent as a 
result thereof; and (4) the debtor received "less than a reasonably 
equivalent value in exchange for such transfer."  BFP v. Resolution 
Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, ___, 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1760 (1994) 
(quoting 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A)).  The first two elements were 
not disputed. 
                                1. 
         On the issue of insolvency, which is defined in § 
101(32)(A) of the Code as a financial condition where an entity's 
debts exceed its property (at fair valuation), the bankruptcy court 
focused upon August 31, 1991, the end of Intershoe's fiscal year.  
It concluded that the Committee had established through the 
testimony of four certified public accountants, who relied upon 
Intershoe's audited (and adjusted) financials, that Intershoe was 
insolvent as of that date. 
         Mellon attempted to argue that it was the write-offs that 
rendered Intershoe insolvent, and that the write-offs were caused 
by the collapse of the Mellon Bank-Intershoe deal.  The bankruptcy 
court disagreed: 
         Although events which drastically and 
         unexpectedly change a company's actual 
         financial condition (such as a fire or other 
         disaster) would not be the type of subsequent 
         event that should evidence a company's prior 
         financial condition, I agreed with the 
         testimony of the Committee's experts that the 
         failure of the proposed Mellon/Intershoe 
         transaction is exactly the type of event that 
         should be viewed as evidence of the company's 
         prior financial condition. 
 
              By all accounts, Intershoe's financial 
         survival was contingent upon the Mellon 
         refinancing and the Mellon refinancing was 
         contingent upon dozens of conditions, the 
         least certain and most important of which was 
         an equity infusion from TCR.  TCR had made no 
         commitment to go through with the investment, 
         and, more importantly, the financial numbers 
         coming out of Intershoe in September, October 
         and November of 1991, showed a deteriorating 
         financial condition that would cause serious 
         concern to a potential equity investor.  
         Although there was testimony that supported 
         Mellon's belief that TCR still was considering 
         the transaction into November, 1991, the 
         evidence was persuasive that TCR's 
         participation was sufficiently uncertain that 
         anticipated consummation of the equity 
         investment and ultimately the Intershoe/Mellon 
         transaction should not be the basis for 
         upholding book entries that ultimately turned 
         out to have no basis in reality. 
 
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of R.M.L., Inc. v. Mellon 
Bank N.A., No. 1-93-00137A, slip op. at 15-16 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. June 
29, 1995).  Based on these audited financials, the bankruptcy court 
noted that between August and November of 1991, Intershoe suffered 
"numerous materially adverse changes which resulted in $4.1 million 
in losses for September and October, 1991."  Id. at 6 (footnote 
omitted).  The court also noted that "by the end of October, 1991, 
Intershoe's liabilities exceeded its assets by $8,187,903."  Id.n.2.  The 
bankruptcy court went on to conclude that, even without 
placing exclusive reliance upon the audited financial statements, 
subsequent events shed sufficient light on Intershoe's financial 
condition as to warrant downward adjustments in various alleged 
"credits" and book entries.  Id. at 18.  
                                2. 
         The bankruptcy court next considered whether Intershoe 
had received "reasonably equivalent value" for the three separate 
remittances of financing fees.  Although the term "reasonably 
equivalent value" is not defined in the Code, the court 
acknowledged that the debtor need not receive a dollar-for-dollar 
equivalent in order to receive reasonably equivalent value.  The 
court further acknowledged that the fair value of services rendered 
in exchange for fees paid may be difficult to quantify, yet 
nonetheless may constitute reasonably equivalent value.  The court 
applied a "totality of the circumstances" test, which considered: 
(1) the good faith of the transferee (Mellon Bank); (2) the fair 
market value compared to the price paid; and (3) whether the 
transaction was at arm's length. 
                                a. 
         The bankruptcy court's conclusions concerning the August 
12, 1991, transfer of $125,000 were somewhat contradictory.  This 
transfer was the good-faith deposit required by the August 9, 1991, 
proposal letter to cover Mellon's out-of-pocket expenses.  The 
court first concluded that the transfer had conferred no value on 
Intershoe, observing that the loan had failed to close and that 
Intershoe's financial condition had not improved.  See id. at 26 
("The Committee's evidence that no benefit was conferred is simple 
and accessible yet is quite powerful in its simplicity."). 
         The bankruptcy court rejected Mellon's contention that 
the existence of the proposal letter had indirect benefits, such as 
encouraging Signet to extend its financing commitment or causing 
trade creditors to extend unsecured credit.  The court observed 
that Intershoe's trade suppliers extended credit both before the 
financing proposal and after the deal with Mellon had collapsed.  
Thus, the prospect of financing from Mellon lacked a causal 
relationship with the trade suppliers' extension of credit.  The 
court further noted that the existence of Mellon's financing 
commitment had little or no effect on Signet's decision to extend 
its loan facility. 
         Notwithstanding these conclusions, the bankruptcy court 
determined that Mellon could retain the $125,000 transfer: 
         Mellon established a valid contractual basis 
         for retention of the $125,000.00.  The August 
         9, 1991, proposal letter provides for a good 
         faith deposit in that amount and Mellon 
         established to my satisfaction that such 
         agreement was of an ordinary commercial nature 
         and that Mellon actually and reasonably 
         incurred out-of-pocket expenses through the 
         cessation of its takedown examination in 
         excess of the $125,000.00 deposit such as 
         warranted retention of the deposit under the 
         agreement.  The contractual nature of this 
         relationship is entitled to some degree of 
         respect in the balancing.  Additionally[] . . 
         . the evidence indicated that the parties were 
         at arm's-length at the time the proposal was 
         issued and accepted.  Finally, a three month 
         period passed between the transfer of the 
         initial $125,000.00 and the termination of the 
         proposed transaction; there was adequate time 
         for some degree of the types of indirect 
         benefit alleged by Mellon to accrue with 
         respect to this initial transfer. 
 
Id. at 26-27.  The court also rejected the Committee's claim that 
the expenses were inflated and unreasonable. 
                                b. 
         The October 8, 1991, transfer of $125,000 was described 
in testimony as an additional good-faith deposit.  It was not 
discussed in the proposal letter, however, and there was no 
independent documentation of it.  The bankruptcy court determined 
that, if no commitment letter had issued, Intershoe would have been 
entitled to a refund of this good-faith deposit (as well as the 
first one).  It drew this conclusion from the fact that the 
proposal letter did not provide for Mellon's retention of the 
"deposits."  Indeed, it was not until the Letter was executed on 
November 7, 1991, that Intershoe gave up its right to a refund of 
the $250,000 in good-faith deposits it had paid to Mellon.  Because 
it was on November 7 that the second deposit became "irrevocable" 
under the terms of the executed commitment letter, the bankruptcy 
court chose that date--not October 8--as the date of the transfer 
for "reasonably equivalent value" purposes. 
         The bankruptcy court concluded that Mellon had conferred 
no benefit, direct or otherwise, on Intershoe between November 7 
and the collapse of the deal after TCR's withdrawal on November 17, 
1991.  It found, first, that the short-lived commitment conferred 
little or no value because it was highly conditional; i.e., it was 
contingent upon a significant equity investment from TCR, which had 
made no formal commitment to invest in Intershoe.  The court 
observed that Intershoe's deteriorating financial condition would 
have deterred an equity investor from making such an investment.  
The court then noted that the commitment letter conferred no 
indirect value on Intershoe, such as causing trade suppliers or 
Signet to extend credit. 
         The bankruptcy court rejected Mellon's claims that it had 
conferred value to the extent its officers had expended "man-hours" 
working on the deal and opportunity costs of forgoing other deals.  
From the perspective of Intershoe's creditors, it reasoned, 
Mellon's internal costs were irrelevant if no value had been 
conferred on the debtor: "what would have been important would have 
been a firm and less conditional commitment."  Id. at 31.  The 
court further concluded, based on trial testimony, that "internal 
costs are not normally factored into loan transactions exclusive of 
facility-type fees; therefore there is no commercial basis 
independent of the November 7th agreement for retention of" the 
second good-faith deposit.  Id.   
         Finally, the bankruptcy court pointed out that  
         [b]y November 7th, the arm's-length nature of 
         Intershoe's relationship with Mellon had 
         disintegrated; Intershoe's financial condition 
         had deteriorated and the Mellon loan appeared 
         to be one of few if not the only remaining 
         option Intershoe had to survive as a going 
         concern.  Mellon, then, had the opportunity to 
         extract fees not ordinarily warranted on a 
         (sic) arm's length commercial basis. 
 
Id. (footnote omitted).  The court observed in a footnote that 
while it was rejecting the Committee's suggestion that by November 
7th Mellon was simply extracting fees for a loan commitment that it 
knew would never come to fruition, "Mellon had ample reason to 
believe there was a significant possibility that Intershoe could 
not meet one or more of the conditions of the commitment letter, 
including the TCR equity investment."  Id. n.17. 
         With respect to the second "good-faith deposit," the 
bankruptcy court held that "it is extremely difficult to conclude 
that Mellon's conditional commitment had a great deal of value.  
Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the Committee has 
established that Mellon failed to confer reasonably equivalent 
value . . . ."  Id. at 31-32. 
                                c. 
         The bankruptcy court then turned to the $265,000 transfer 
on November 7, 1991, which represented the nonrefundable 
facility/agent's fee contemplated by the commitment letter.  For 
essentially the same reasons that it found that no value had been 
conferred in exchange for the October 8 transfer (which in reality 
also occurred on November 7), the bankruptcy court concluded that 
Intershoe had not received reasonably equivalent value for the 
facility fee.  Although recognizing that Mellon had put on credible 
evidence that a $265,000 facility fee was commensurate with fees in 
the industry for the size of the loan at issue, that did not alter 
the analysis, the bankruptcy court said.  It was unlikely that 
under ordinary circumstances Intershoe would have handed over large 
fees where the letter was conditioned upon an equity investment but 
where there was no firm commitment from the equity investor.  
Again, the court noted that from the creditors' perspective, Mellon 
had provided Intershoe with little, if any, value in drafting a 
highly conditional commitment letter. 
                                3. 
         On appeal, the District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania affirmed, adopting the bankruptcy court's opinion as 
its own.  Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured 
Creditors of R.M.L., Inc., No. 1:CV-95-1200 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 
1995).  This appeal followed. 
                               II. 
         The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over this adversary 
(core) proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H).  The 
district court exercised appellate jurisdiction over Mellon's 
appeal from the bankruptcy court's final order under 28 U.S.C. § 
158(a)(1).  We have appellate jurisdiction to review the district 
court's final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291. 
         Whether Intershoe was insolvent or received "less than 
fair consideration" are mixed questions of law and fact.  Moody v. 
Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1063 (3d Cir. 
1992).  Thus, while the factual findings underlying those 
determinations are reviewed only for clear error, see, e.g., Mellon 
Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 641-42 (3d 
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 937, 112 S. Ct. 1476 (1992), our 
review of "the trial court's choice and interpretation of legal 
precepts and its application of those precepts to the historical 
facts" is plenary.  Id. at 642 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 
98, 103 (3d Cir. 1981)). 
                               III. 
         As it did in the courts below, Mellon Bank urges reversal 
on two grounds.  First, Mellon Bank asserts that the commitment 
letter conferred "reasonably equivalent value" on Intershoe, the 
measure of which is the fair market value of the services it 
rendered (i.e., the $515,000 in commitment fees Intershoe paid).  
Second, Mellon Bank claims that based upon Intershoe's own balance 
sheets at the time of the disputed transfers, Intershoe was not 
insolvent. 
                                A. 
                   Reasonably Equivalent Value 
         Mellon Bank launches a multi-pronged attack on the 
bankruptcy court's reasonably equivalent value analysis, assailing 
the court's use of a totality of the circumstances test.  The 
gravamen of Mellon Bank's challenge is that its commitment letter 
conferred "reasonably equivalent value" on Intershoe, measured by 
the fair market value of the services it provided (i.e., the fees 
paid by Intershoe, which were consistent with "the going rate").  
Additionally, Mellon Bank contends that the bankruptcy court failed 
to appreciate that commitment letters confer "value" to the extent 
that they provide a financially troubled company with the "chance" 
of obtaining financing that could save it from bankruptcy. 
         We agree that the factors underlying the totality of the 
circumstances test (e.g., fair market value, arm's-length 
relationship, and good faith) are simply not relevant to the 
initial question whether the commitment letter in this case 
conferred any value on Intershoe.  We also agree that the mere 
"opportunity" to receive an economic benefit in the future 
constitutes "value" under the Code.  As we explain more fully 
below, however, fatal to Mellon Bank's position is the bankruptcy 
court's record-supported factual finding that the chances of the 
loan closing were negligible.  The court essentially found that 
Intershoe was exchanging substantial fees for an extremely remote 
opportunity to receive value in the future.  Because we agree that 
this minimal "value" was not "reasonably equivalent," to the 
lending fees Intershoe remitted to Mellon Bank, we will affirm the 
bankruptcy court's determination. 
                                1. 
                                a. 
         Both parties take issue with the bankruptcy court's 
totality of the circumstances test.  Accordingly, we turn first to 
the appropriate method of determining reasonably equivalent value.  
The concept of reasonably equivalent value unfortunately has not 
been defined in the Code.  As the Supreme Court noted in BFP v. 
Resolution Trust Corp., "[o]f the three critical terms 'reasonably 
equivalent value', only the last is defined: 'value' means, for 
purposes of § 548, 'property, or satisfaction or securing of a . . 
. debt of the debtor' . . . ."  511 U.S. 531, ___, 114 S. Ct. 1757, 
1760 (1994) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A)).  Thus, "Congress 
left to the courts the obligation of marking the scope and meaning 
of [reasonably equivalent value]."  In re Morris Communications NC, 
Inc., 914 F.2d 458, 466 (4th Cir. 1990). 
         The lack of a more precise definition has led to 
considerable difficulty.  This definitional problem is exacerbated 
in cases where, as here, the debtor exchanges cash for intangibles, 
such as services or the opportunity to obtain economic value in the 
future, the value of which is difficult, if not impossible, to 
ascertain.  Because such intangibles are technically not within § 
548(d)(2)(A)'s definition of "value," courts have struggled to 
develop a workable test for reasonably equivalent value.  See 
generally In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996) (determining 
whether debtors obtained "value" in exchange for charitable 
contributions to church); In re Chomakos, 69 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 
1995) (examining whether debtors obtained "value" in exchange for 
$7,710 in gambling losses), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1568 (1996); 
In re Morris Communications NC, Inc., 914 F.2d at 458 (attempting 
to determine "value" of shares in corporation whose only asset was 
a license application pending before the FCC that had a one in 
twenty-two chance of approval); In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 6 
F.3d 1119, 1125-26 (5th Cir. 1993) (deciding whether money debtor 
spent in failed attempt to keep commuter airline afloat conferred 
"value" on the debtor). 
         In attempting to determine whether Mellon's commitment 
letter conferred any value on Intershoe, the bankruptcy court 
purported to apply a totality of the circumstances test.  Drawn 
from other reasonably equivalent value cases, that test takes into 
account the fair market value of the item received by, or services 
performed for, the debtor; the existence of an arm's-length 
relationship between the debtor and the transferee; and the good 
faith of the transferee.  These factors, however, have no bearing 
on whether any "value" was actually conferred on the debtor.  At 
most, the fair market value and the arm's-length nature of the 
relationship are relevant to the price the debtor paid.  But the 
price that the debtor paid, in and of itself, reveals nothing about 
whether the debtor received something of actual "value."  A simple 
example illustrates our point: 
         Within one year of filing for bankruptcy, Dpays a window-washer 
$1,000 to clean the 
         windows in an office building.  The $1,000 
         constitutes the going rate for such a job, and 
         the window-washer is unaware of D's financial 
         condition. 
 
That the $1,000 D paid represents the fair market value of the 
window-washer's services and that the transaction was at arm's 
length say absolutely nothing about whether the debtor received 
"value;" "value" was conferred because D obtained a palpable 
benefit from the service performed--i.e., clean windows. 
         The bankruptcy court, therefore, conflated two inquiries 
that should remain separate and distinct: before determining 
whether the value was "reasonably equivalent" to what the debtor 
gave up, the court must make an express factual determination as to 
whether the debtor received any value at all.  The bankruptcy court 
seemed to recognize this as it attempted to reconcile the totality 
of the circumstances test with our analysis in Metro 
Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d at 635. 
                                b. 
         Metro Communications, Inc. involved a loan that Mellon 
Bank provided to the acquiror in a leveraged buy-out ("LBO").  As 
collateral for the LBO loan, Metro, the target of the LBO, gave 
Mellon Bank a security interest and guarantee in substantially all 
of its assets.  With the LBO loan, Mellon also provided a credit 
facility to Metro, also secured by Metro's assets.  Less than one 
year later, Metro sought protection under the Code.  A committee of 
unsecured creditors brought an adversary proceeding alleging, inter 
alia, that the granting of the security interests were 
constructively fraudulent transfers under § 548(a)(2) of the Code.  
The bankruptcy and district courts concluded that Metro had not 
received reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the security 
interests it provided to Mellon Bank. 
         In reversing, we observed that "[b]ecause Metro did not 
receive the proceeds of the acquisition loan, it did not receive 
any direct benefits from extending the guaranty and security 
interest collateralizing that guaranty."  Id. at 646.  
Nevertheless, we stressed that 
         indirect benefits may also be evaluated. . . . 
         These indirect economic benefits must be 
         measured and then compared to the obligations 
         the bankrupt incurred. . . . The touchstone is 
         whether the transaction conferred realizable 
         commercial value on the debtor reasonably 
         equivalent to the realizable commercial value 
         of the assets transferred. 
 
Id. at 646-47 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  We went on to 
discover two indirect benefits that conferred "value" on Metro.  
The first was Mellon Bank's extension of a credit facility to 
Metro: "[t]he ability to borrow money has considerable value in the 
commercial world.  To quantify that value, however, is difficult.  
Quantification depends upon the business opportunities the 
additional credit makes available to the borrowing corporation and 
on other imponderables in the operation or expansion of its 
business."  Id. at 647.  The second indirect benefit created by 
Metro's granting of a security interest in its assets, which 
allowed the LBO to close, was a "legitimate and reasonableexpectation that 
the affiliation of these two corporations . . . 
would produce a strong synergy."  Id. (emphasis added).  
Significantly, we found that the expected synergy created "value," 
even though an unforseen change in the law prevented it from 
becoming a reality.  
                                c. 
         In spite of the plain requirement that the debtor 
actually receive something of value, Mellon Bank continues to 
insist that the fair market value of services rendered is 
conclusively determinative of reasonably equivalent value.  To 
support this contention it relies on the Supreme Court's recent 
decision in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. at 531, 114 S. 
Ct. at 1757.  BFP, of course, stands for no such proposition.  The 
Court there held that the proceeds of a mortgage foreclosure sale 
conducted in accordance with state law constitute "reasonably 
equivalent value" as a matter of law, even where those proceeds are 
substantially below the fair market value of the real estate sold.  
The BFP Court noted in passing that "the 'reasonably equivalent 
value' criterion will continue to have independent meaning 
(ordinarily a meaning similar to fair market value) outside the 
foreclosure context."  511 U.S. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at 1765.   
         The dictum in BFP does not help Mellon Bank, however, 
because in the real estate context there is no doubt that the 
debtor is receiving something of "value" (i.e., cash) in exchange 
for real property, which also has a measurable value.  Thus, the 
real issue in BFP was not whether any value was exchanged, but 
rather whether the value obtained was "reasonably equivalent" to 
what was given up.  Thus, BFP in no way alters the requirement that 
when the debtor transfers property--whether it be real estate or 
cash--it must receive something of "value" in return. 
         This is fully consistent with our decision in Metro 
Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d at 646, which noted that the 
fraudulent conveyance laws are intended to protect the debtor's 
creditors.  Rejecting Mellon Bank's contention that the debtor had 
received "value" simply because the bank had parted with value by 
loaning funds, we said that "[t]he purpose of the laws is estate 
preservation; thus, the question whether the debtor receivedreasonable 
value must be determined from the standpoint of the 
creditors."  Id.  Mellon Bank's assertion in this case that it has 
conferred value simply because the fees it charged Intershoe 
represent the fair market value of Mellon Bank's services similarly 
misses the mark. 
         In sum, in light of our decision in Metro Communications, 
Inc., the bankruptcy court committed legal error to the extent that 
it applied a totality of the circumstances test to the initial 
question whether the commitment letter at issue conferred any value 
on Intershoe.  To determine whether this threshold requirement was 
satisfied, the court should have examined whether Intershoe 
received any benefit from the commitment letter, whether direct or 
indirect, without regard to the cost of Mellon Bank's services, the 
contractual and arm's-length nature of the relationship, and the 
good faith of the transferee. 
                                2. 
         Its application of the totality of the circumstances test 
notwithstanding, the bankruptcy court announced two conclusions 
essential to the resolution of the question whether Intershoe had 
received any value in exchange for the commitment fees it had 
remitted to Mellon Bank.  The court first determined that Mellon 
Bank's commitment letter did not confer any tangible, indirect 
benefits on Intershoe.  For instance, the court found that Signet's 
extension of its credit facility beyond the original expiration 
date and the trade suppliers' decision to extend credit to 
Intershoe were not the direct result of Mellon Bank's willingness 
to lend funds to Intershoe.  The court then determined that the 
loan commitment failed to confer any significant intangiblebenefits on 
Intershoe.  Specifically, the court determined that the 
commitment letter essentially offered only a very slim "chance" of 
obtaining a substantial economic benefit in the future because it 
contained numerous conditions that, in all likelihood, could not 
have been satisfied. 
         With this latter determination the bankruptcy court 
implicitly held that money spent on an investment bearing a certain 
degree of risk can generate cognizable value within the meaning of 
§ 548(a)(2) of the Code, even where the investment ultimately fails 
to generate a positive return.  The Committee disputes this legal 
conclusion, arguing that money spent on a losing investment fails 
to confer "value" as a matter of law.  If the Committee is correct, 
then we would be compelled to affirm since it is undisputed that 
Intershoe exchanged $515,000 in fees for a loan that never closed.  
Accordingly, we address this preliminary question before reviewing 
the propriety of the bankruptcy court's factual findings. 
                                a. 
         Relying on the following language from our decision in 
Metro Communications, Inc., the Committee argues that where the 
debtor's financial condition either continues to deteriorate or 
fails to stabilize, money spent on a losing investment cannot 
confer "value" as a matter of law: 
         The touchstone is whether the transaction 
         conferred realizable commercial value on the 
         debtor reasonably equivalent to the realizable 
         commercial value of the assets transferred.  
         Thus, when the debtor is a going concern and 
         its realizable going concern value after the 
         transaction is equal to or exceeds its going 
         concern value before the transaction, 
         reasonably equivalent value has been received. 
 
945 F.2d at 647 (emphasis added).  We disagree.  The Committee's 
argument depends for its validity on the contention that the 
highlighted sentence is part and parcel of the Metro 
Communications, Inc. court's holding.  If that were true, then our 
Internal Operating Procedures would mandate an affirmance here, 
since it is clear that Intershoe's going concern value declined at 
the time of the disputed transfers to Mellon Bank.  Kirk v. Raymark 
Indus., Inc., 61 F.3d 147, 168 (3d Cir. 1995) ("The holding of a 
panel in a reported opinion is binding on subsequent panels.") 
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted) (quoting I.O.P. 
Rule 9.1).  But we view the highlighted passage as providing an 
example of how a court can determine that a debtor received directbenefits 
and, thus, "value" from a transaction.  Significantly, the 
court in Metro Communications, Inc. went on to discover several 
potential, intangible benefits that, although incapable of precise 
measurement, conferred value on Metro despite their failure to 
materialize.  That should dispel any suggestion that Metro 
Communications, Inc. stands for the proposition that a debtor must 
receive a direct, tangible economic benefit in order to receive 
"value" for purposes of § 548(a)(2) of the Code. 
         Furthermore, were we literally to apply the highlighted 
statement from Metro Communications, Inc. as the categorical test 
for value under § 548(a)(2), we would announce a rule for this 
Circuit that only successful investments can confer value on a 
debtor.  This would permit a court viewing the events with the 
benefit of hindsight to conclude that any transfer that did not 
bring in the actual, economic equivalent of what was given up fails 
to confer reasonably equivalent value as a matter of law.  Such an 
unduly restrictive approach to reasonably equivalent value has been 
soundly rejected by other courts, Chomakos, 69 F.3d at 771 
(gambling losses conferred value on debtor); Fairchild Aircraft 
Corp., 6 F.3d at 1119 (money spent in failed attempt to keep 
commuter airline afloat conferred value on debtor), and with good 
reason.  Presumably the creditors whom § 548 was designed to 
protect want a debtor to take some risks that could generate value 
and, thus, allow it to meet its obligations without resort to 
protection under the Bankruptcy Code: 
         According to [appellant], the only value that 
         can be considered is property actually 
         received.  Under this view the value of an 
         investment--no matter how large and how 
         probable the potential return--cannot be 
         considered unless it actually pays off, and 
         only to the extent that it does so. . . . The 
         narrow "realized property" approach to value 
         advanced by [appellant] finds no approbation 
         in the law. 
 
Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 6 F.3d at 1126-27.  Accordingly, we hold 
that money spent on investments that fail to stabilize or improve 
the debtor's condition (i.e., "losing" investments) can confer 
value within the meaning of § 548(a)(2) of the Code. 
         The question, then, is how to determine whether an 
investment that failed to generate a positive return nevertheless 
conferred value on the debtor.  We think our decision in Metro 
Communications, Inc. answers this question implicitly.  We held 
there that the mere expectation that the fusion of two companies 
would produce a strong synergy (an expectation that turned out to 
be inaccurate in hindsight) would suffice to confer "value" so long 
as the expectation was "legitimate and reasonable."  Id. at 647 
(emphasis added).  See id. ("The touchstone is whether the 
transaction conferred realizable commercial value on the debtor . 
. . .") (emphasis added).  Thus, so long as there is some chance 
that a contemplated investment will generate a positive return at 
the time of the disputed transfer, we will find that value has been 
conferred.  Accord Chomakos, 69 F.3d at 771 (because legalized 
gambling provides fair chance for significant pay-off, $7,710 in 
gambling losses conferred value on debtor); Fairchild Aircraft 
Corp., 6 F.3d at 1126 ($432,380.91 spent in failed attempt to keep 
commuter airline viable conferred value because "the likelihood 
that a sale would occur was also demonstrably high"); cf. Morris 
Communications NC, Inc., 914 F.2d at 458 (shares in a corporation 
whose only asset was a licensing application pending before the FCC 
with a one in twenty-two chance of approval had value). 
         We think our analysis appropriately balances a creditor's 
interest in estate preservation against a debtor's legitimate, pre- 
bankruptcy efforts to take risks that, if successful, could 
generate significant value and, possibly, avoid the need for 
protection under the Code altogether.  As we noted above, requiring 
that all investments yield a positive return in order to find that 
they conferred value on the debtor would be unduly restrictive.  
But so, too, would a rule insulating from § 548's coverage 
investments that, when made, have zero probability of success.  The 
best solution, therefore, is to determine, based on the 
circumstances that existed at the time the investment was 
contemplated, whether there was any chance that the investment 
would generate a positive return.  In this way creditors will be 
protected when an irresponsible debtor invests in a venture that is 
obviously doomed from the outset. 
                                b. 
         With these legal principles in mind, our review of the 
bankruptcy court's conclusion that Intershoe did not receive 
reasonably equivalent value proceeds in two, discrete steps: first, 
we determine whether the commitment letter conferred any value on 
Intershoe; second, we consider the bankruptcy court's finding that 
whatever value was conferred was not "reasonably equivalent" to the 
two transfers of lending fees totaling $390,000 is clearly 
erroneous. 
         Although the bankruptcy court did not announce an 
explicit finding on the question whether Mellon Bank's commitment 
letter conferred any value on Intershoe, it is clear that the court 
implicitly answered that question in the affirmative.  The 
bankruptcy court stated that "all parties should have known there 
was a substantial probability that the loan would not close[.]"  
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of R.M.L., Inc. v. Mellon 
Bank, N.A., No. 1-93-00137A, slip op. at 32 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. June 
29, 1995) (emphasis added).  Put another way, the court concluded 
that by November 7, 1991, there was a slight chance that the loan 
would close.  This finding is amply supported by the record and, 
hence, cannot be disturbed on appeal.  First, although TCR had not 
formally committed to participate in the deal, there is no evidence 
in the record that TCR had made known its intention to withdraw 
before November 17, 1991.  Thus, as of November 7, 1991, when the 
commitment letter was executed and the disputed fees remitted, 
there was at least some chance that the most important condition in 
the letter could be fulfilled.  With respect to the other 
conditions in the letter, which pertained mainly to Intershoe's 
financial condition, record evidence reveals that, despite 
Intershoe's deteriorating condition, Mellon was willing to waive or 
modify many of these conditions.  Since we review the transaction 
at the time the transfer was made, In re Chomakos, 69 F.3d 770-71, 
the bankruptcy's court's implicit determination that the letter 
provided Intershoe with at least some chance of receiving a future 
economic benefit and, therefore, "value" is not clearly erroneous. 
         We next consider the bankruptcy court's determination 
that whatever value was conferred by the letter, it was not 
"reasonably equivalent" to the $390,000 in lending fees Intershoe 
paid to Mellon Bank.  We conclude that in assessing the reasonable 
equivalence issue, the bankruptcy court appropriately relied on the 
totality of the circumstances test.  See Barrett v. Commonwealth  
Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 939 F.2d 20, 22 (3d Cir. 1991); see alsoIn re 
Chomakos, 170 B.R. 585, 592 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993), aff'd, 
69 F.3d at 769 (both considering a variety of factors, including 
the fair market value compared to the actual price paid and the 
arm's-length nature of the transaction). 
         Mellon Bank insists that the court's findings that: (1) 
the fees Intershoe paid were in line with market rates; (2) Mellon 
Bank acted in good faith; and (3) for the most part, the parties 
dealt at arm's length, render clearly erroneous its conclusion that 
Intershoe did not receive value that was "reasonably equivalent."  
We disagree.  As our discussion of "value" should have made clear, 
supra III.A.2.a, while the chance of receiving an economic benefit 
is sufficient to constitute "value," the size of the chance is 
directly correlated with the amount of "value" conferred.  Thus, 
essential to a proper application of the totality of the 
circumstances test in this case is a comparison between the value 
that was conferred and fees Intershoe paid.  Metro Communications, 
Inc., 945 F.2d at 646 ("indirect economic benefits must be measured 
and then compared to the obligations that the bankrupt incurred"). 
         So understood, the bankruptcy court's conclusion that the 
chance of receiving value represented by the commitment letter was 
so small that it was not reasonably equivalent to the $390,000 in 
fees Intershoe paid in no way conflicts with the court's 
observation that the commitment fees were in line with market 
rates.  The bankruptcy court concluded that while a debtor 
reasonably might pay $390,000 in fees for a real chance to obtain 
a $53 million credit facility, the commitment letter at issue in 
this case was so conditional that it provided Intershoe with little 
chance, if any, to obtain the loan it sought.  Accordingly, as long 
as there is support in the record for the bankruptcy court's 
conclusion that the commitment letter was highly conditional (and, 
thus, of little "value"), we must affirm. 
         That the loan was highly conditional cannot seriously be 
disputed.  The bankruptcy court concluded that "both transfers were 
made in exchange for a highly conditional loan commitment, and all 
parties should have known there was a substantial probability that 
the loan would not close."  Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors 
of R.M.L., Inc., No. 1-93-00137A, slip op. at 32.  Significantly, 
the court found that "TCR had made no commitment to participate in 
the transaction and Intershoe's deteriorating financial condition 
was a deterrent to an equity investor."  Id. at 30.  The court 
further stated that "there was a significant possibility that 
Intershoe could not meet one or more of the conditions of the 
commitment letter, including the TCR equity investment."  Id. at 31 
n.17.  Finally, the court noted that "Intershoe's financial 
survival was contingent upon the Mellon refinancing and the Mellon 
refinancing was contingent upon dozens of conditions, the least 
certain and most important of which was an equity infusion from 
TCR." Id. at 16.  Since all of these findings have ample support in 
the record, the bankruptcy court's conclusion that the commitment 
letter conferred minimal value--value that was not reasonably 
equivalent to the fees Intershoe paid--is not clearly erroneous. 
         We acknowledge that the measurement and comparison called 
for by Metro Communications, Inc. is no easy task.  Indeed, we 
noted in that case that "[t]he ability to borrow money has 
considerable value in the commercial world.  To quantify that 
value, however, is difficult."  945 F.2d at 647.  Yet we expressed 
no reservations about the bankruptcy courts' ability to analyze 
such potential, intangible benefits.  We also acknowledge that 
whether a contemplated investment provided a significant "chance" 
to receive value more often than not will be bound up in the 
bankruptcy court's factual determinations and, thus, largely immune 
from attack on appeal.  But this is as it should be; the bankruptcy 
court, with its unique expertise, is in far better position than 
either the district courts, sitting as appellate tribunals, or the 
courts of appeals to make such determinations.  See generally In re 
Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 6 F.3d at 1125 n.5 (noting that fairness 
of consideration received is a "fact-laden" inquiry that ought to 
be reviewed deferentially). 
         In sum, because Intershoe expended $390,000 in commitment 
fees for a loan that had little chance of closing, we agree that 
the Committee met its burden of establishing that Intershoe failed 
to receive reasonably equivalent value. 
                                B. 
                            Insolvency 
         Mellon Bank next contends that the Committee failed to 
establish that Intershoe was "insolvent," see 11 U.S.C. § 
548(a)(2)(B)(i), on the dates of the disputed transfers.  Section 
101(32)(A) of the Code defines insolvency as a "financial condition 
such that the sum of such entity's debts is greater than all of 
such entity's property, at a fair valuation . . . ."  11 U.S.C. § 
101(32)(A).  For purposes of § 548, solvency is measured at the 
time the debtor transferred value, not at some later or earlier 
time.  Metro Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d at 648.  This is known 
as the "balance sheet" test: "assets and liabilities are tallied at 
fair valuation to determine whether the corporation's debts exceed 
its assets."  Id. (emphasis added).   
         Mellon Bank's principal argument is that the bankruptcy 
court inappropriately relied on an audited, year-end financial 
statement indicating that Intershoe had a net worth of negative $4 
million as of August 31, 1991.  That financial statement was 
prepared several months after the disputed transfers were made and, 
according to Mellon Bank, reflected "substantial adjustments" that 
were "precipitated by the collapse of the Mellon-TCR transaction . 
. . ."  Mellon Bank's Br. at 41.  But for that unexpected collapse, 
Mellon Bank argues, several alleged "credits" Intershoe was 
carrying on its books rendered it solvent, at least on paper, at 
the time it remitted the disputed commitment fees to Mellon Bank.  
In short, Mellon bank accuses the bankruptcy court of relying on 
hindsight to conclude that Intershoe was insolvent in October 
through November of 1991.  This argument need not detain us long. 
         The use of hindsight to evaluate a debtor's financial 
condition for purposes of the Code's "insolvency" element has been 
criticized by courts and commentators alike.  See, e.g., Credit 
Managers Ass'n of S. California v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 
186 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (looking at whether projected cash flows were 
reasonable when made, not whether they ultimately panned out); Ohio 
Corrugating Co. v. DPAC, Inc., 91 B.R. 430, 438 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
1988) ("The court feels that participants in an LBO must be 
protected from the perfect hindsight often evidenced in creditors' 
subsequent attacks on the corporate buyout."); Raymond J. 
Blackwood, Note, Applying Fraudulent Conveyance Law to Leveraged 
Buyouts, 42 Duke L.J. 340, 381 (1992) ("[C]ourts should take care 
not to indulge in hindsight."); Kenneth C. Kettering, The 
Pennsylvania Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 65 Pa. B.A. Q. 67, 75 
(1994) ("The debtor should not be responsible as a matter of 
hindsight for developments that could not reasonably have been 
foreseen at the time of the transfer."). 
         Hindsight, however, is not what prompted the bankruptcy 
court to ignore certain alleged "credits" and, thus, conclude that 
Intershoe was insolvent.  On the contrary, and as Mellon Bank 
acknowledges, at least two alleged "credits," which together 
totaled $4.3 million, depended for their validity on Intershoe's 
belief that the loan would close.  As we have already discussed, 
the bankruptcy court found, as a matter of fact, that Intershoe 
knew or should have known that its deteriorating financial 
condition would preclude it from meeting one or more of the 
conditions in the commitment letter: 
              By all accounts, Intershoe's financial 
         survival was contingent upon the Mellon 
         refinancing and the Mellon refinancing was 
         contingent upon dozens of conditions, the 
         least certain and most important of which was 
         an equity infusion from TCR.  TCR had made no 
         commitment to go through with the investment, 
         and, more importantly, the financial numbers 
         coming out of Intershoe in September, October 
         and November of 1991, showed a deteriorating 
         financial condition that would cause serious 
         concern to a potential equity investor. . . . 
         [T]he evidence was persuasive that TCR's 
         participation was sufficiently uncertain that 
         anticipated consummation of the equity 
         investment and ultimately the Intershoe/Mellon 
         transaction should not be the basis for 
         upholding book entries that ultimately turned 
         out to have no basis in reality. 
 
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of R.M.L., Inc., No. 1-93- 
00137A, slip op. at 16 (emphasis added).  This conclusion is fatal 
to Mellon Bank's position.  The bankruptcy court correctly 
determined that a debtor's creative accounting practices, which 
have the effect of grossly overstating its financial condition, 
cannot be the basis of a court's solvency analysis. 
         Furthermore, if a debtor's treatment of an item as an 
"asset" depends for its propriety on the occurrence of a contingent 
event, a court must take into consideration the likelihood of that 
event occurring from an objective standpoint.  See, e.g., In Re 
Xonics Photochemical, Inc., 841 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1988) ("the 
asset or liability must be reduced to its present, or expected, 
value before a determination can be made whether the firm's assets 
exceed its liabilities").  Such an analysis is by no means unknown 
to the law.  See generally Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 
108 S. Ct. 978 (1988) (adopting test from SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 
U.S. 976, 89 S. Ct. 1454 (1969), that materiality of contingent 
corporate event is determined by balancing probability of event 
occurring against its anticipated magnitude).  Far from "hindsight" 
or "post-hoc" analysis, a court looks at the circumstances as they 
appeared to the debtor and determines whether the debtor's belief 
that a future event would occur was reasonable.  The less 
reasonable a debtor's belief, the more a court is justified in 
reducing the assets (or raising liabilities) to reflect the 
debtor's true financial condition at the time of the alleged 
transfers. 
         In this case, moreover, Daniel Coffey, a certified public 
accountant who served as the Committee's insolvency expert, 
revealed that in the course of performing an audit, accountants 
abide by a far more stringent rule.  Mr. Coffey testified that "in 
reality, if an auditor didn't think there was a real 99 percent 
chance that this loan is going to close, they wouldn't leave [the 
"credits"] on the balance sheet.  Everybody would say let's sit and 
wait and see what happens."  App. at 1610.  Since the bankruptcy 
court found that the probability of the loan closing was 
essentially zero, a finding we have already determined is amply 
supported by the record, the court properly discounted (to zero) 
the $4.3 million Intershoe had carried on its balance sheet as 
alleged "assets."  Thus, by November of 1991, Intershoe's actual 
assets were $4.3 million lower than its balance sheet had 
reflected. 
         Apart from properly refusing to consider $4.3 million as 
assets, the bankruptcy court also reversed a $4.5 million "asset" 
that Intershoe had carried on its books as a credit due from 
factory suppliers related to defective merchandise: 
         there was no credible evidence offered to 
         substantiate the book-entry for alleged 
         credits from Intershoe's suppliers.  Even in 
         absence of the testimony that adjustments were 
         warranted by GAAP and GAAS, based upon the 
         evidence, I find it entirely appropriate to 
         make downward adjustments to Intershoe's then- 
         value to write off [this] alleged asset[]. 
 
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of R.M.L., Inc., No. 1-93- 
00137A, slip op. at 18.  Far from relying upon hindsight, the court 
concluded that this entry had no basis in fact when it was made.  
As Intershoe was unable to produce any documentation to support 
this alleged "credit," the bankruptcy court's decision to ignore 
the credit is amply supported by the record and, hence, not clearly 
erroneous.   
         In sum, Intershoe was found to have a net worth of 
negative $4 million on August 31, 1991, and negative $8 million on 
November 15, 1991.  The bankruptcy court properly refused to 
consider various items totaling $8.8 million that Intershoe had 
attempted to portray as assets.  Since the transfers at issue here 
occurred on November 7, 1991, the bankruptcy court's insolvency 
determination will be affirmed. 
                               IV. 
         The judgment of the district court affirming the order of 
the bankruptcy court will be affirmed in all respects. 
 
 
 
 
 
